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Why did the amounts and types of poor relief given in mid-nineteenth century England 
and Wales vary so greatly in different parts of the country? The research described in 
this chapter is an effort to tackle this question using geographic information systems 
techniques. The problem has tended to be addressed only in regional aggregate, and 
though the broad-brush approach has yielded a useful overall impression it has not 
provided the fine resolution required for a full, detailed picture of relief practices and 
experiences across the country. This research shows the significance of detailed spatial 
thinking in examining poor relief. First, it shows that mapping relief expenditure at the 
local level provides the opportunity for a more nuanced understanding of the welfare 
landscape; and second, it demonstrates the importance of socio-spatial relationships 
between poor law unions – the local authorities responsible for administrating relief – 
and their surrounding economies. 
The New Poor Law 
From 1834 the destitute of England and Wales had a new environment of rights, 
responsibilities and hazards to navigate, in the form of the Poor Law Amendment Act.1 
Since the end of Elizabeth’s reign, some 15,535 parishes had been responsible for the 
distribution of relief.2 Each had its own practices and policies, and reformers pointed to 
the social and economic ills which resulted from this patchwork of administration.3 
Under the new poor law – the framework for poor relief in England and Wales which 
persisted until the early twentieth century – parishes were encouraged to come 
together as poor law unions run by elected guardians. The object was to ease the tax 
burden for local ratepayers by reducing the number of paupers and by cutting costs 
through economies of scale. The local administration of relief was brought under 
unprecedented central government scrutiny with the formation of the Poor Law 
Commission and its successors, the Poor Law Board and the Local Government Board. 
The use of payments in cash or in kind (‘outdoor’ relief), for able-bodied males at least, 
was to be discouraged in favour of relief inside the workhouse (‘indoor’ relief). To 
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encourage this class of person to find employment, rather than apply for relief, indoor 
relief was to be governed by the principle of ‘less eligibility’: that conditions in the 
workhouse should be no better than those enjoyed by the lowest-paid independent 
labourer. In other words, the poor would exhaust all other options before ‘throwing 
themselves on the parish’. This, reformers believed, would reduce applications for relief 
and therefore overall expenditure.  
The new poor law guardians, elected by ratepayers, had much less discretion over relief 
practices under the new law than the local officials who had formerly administered 
relief. However, it was not the purpose of the central authority to ensure every aspect of 
relief was identical across the country. Expenditure and types of relief varied widely 
between unions throughout the life of the new poor law. The reasons for this variation 
were the subject of the doctoral thesis which formed the basis for the research 
discussed in this chapter.4  
Historians have so far explained differences primarily by local divergence in policy and 
by the uneven demand for poor relief.5 But this research project added a new layer of 
analysis, made possible by GIS: it investigated how far variations in local relief 
expenditure and policy were linked to the local provision of goods and services. Prices 
had an effect both on the buying power of poor law unions, and on the decisions 
guardians made about the extent and types of relief they made available. There were 
complex links between prices and relief provision: High commodity prices could force 
many people to seek relief, or could arise from the same economic circumstances that 
caused destitution. High prices in some circumstances could lead to stricter entitlement 
regimes, through unions’ budgetary constraints. More important, however, were the 
relationships between unions and their suppliers. An institution like a workhouse could 
have had a significant impact on a local economy by creating demand that would 
otherwise not have existed. Suppliers might in some cases have owed their existence to 
the local workhouse consuming their goods. Furthermore, individual unions were 
dependent on markets with varying degrees of competition, flexibility, organisation and 
size.  
Boards of guardians took decisions based on their local circumstances and these 
national and regional contexts. Guardians had little power in the face of economic 
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cycles, regional trade depressions, local outbreaks of infectious diseases and the like. 
However, they could exercise a certain amount of discretion when it came to 
contracting for the supply of goods and services to the union. Regulations issued by the 
central authority could circumscribe guardians’ activities, but they could not bind the 
independent traders who sold goods to the unions. Rather, these interactions were 
subject to existing contract law. This gave boards of guardians flexibility in their 
financial management and thereby their local relationships, putting social structures 
and processes at the heart of poor law economies. To map supplier networks is, 
therefore, to map social relationships. These relationships formed a significant part of 
poor law guardians’ strategies for controlling costs: The demand for goods from poor 
law unions was considerable as workhouses consumed very great quantities of food, 
fuel and clothing – and guardians therefore had significant bargaining power.6 
Nonetheless, in many respects it was the large suppliers who had the advantage in 
dictating prices, and guardians’ procurement practices were not always efficient. 
Workhouse inmates suffered the consequences of unions’ efforts to save costs, with 
suppliers delivering poor quality and sometimes adulterated food. Guardians had the 
dual priorities of keeping costs down, while wanting to spend the rates within their 
unions. They were also constrained by the number of potential suppliers. For reasons of 
availability and cost, therefore, relatively remote unions – such as Llanfyllin, Wales, 
which is examined here – had to rely on cheap suppliers from major towns outside their 
unions. Yet there was also space in the market for more minor traders to gain business 
from poor law supply, and unions gave some trade to local businesses on an ad hoc 
basis.  
The research described in this chapter therefore has three intertwined strands. One is 
the mapping and analysis of poor relief itself. This provides context for the second 
strand: the charting of the prices paid for certain key commodities by poor law unions. 
The third strand is the mapping of supplier locations and networks, which enables a 
deeper understanding of the social relations underpinning poor law supply.  
Data sources 
Historians have tended to aggregate poor law data by county or region, partly as a 
result of the necessity of making the data manageable. The assumption underlying this 
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aggregation is that counties or regions contained little enough variation between their 
constituent poor law unions for that variation to be irrelevant. This is not necessarily 
the case. At the same time, historians have lamented that the sheer volume of material 
on the poor law makes it necessary to illustrate chiefly by example, and that it is 
impossible to know how representative any such example might be.7 Variations in poor 
relief must be considered with more granularity, and this chapter therefore uses 
disaggregated data from all individual poor law unions in Wales, manually digitised 
from British Parliamentary Papers. In so doing, it shows that it is possible to understand 
individual unions in the contexts of their wider regions. The poor law was a local 
institution and was treated as such by paupers, guardians, local officials, ratepayers, 
central government and policymakers. Furthermore, union-level data enable a more 
thorough set of GIS techniques to be adopted than would be the case using county-level 
data.  
The annual poor rate returns published by the Poor Law Commission (PLC) and its 
successors in their annual reports contain information on amounts spent on different 
types of relief and the incidental administrative running costs of poor law unions. Other 
union returns giving numbers of paupers are also available in the ‘Poor rates and 
pauperism’ series of central authority publications ordered annually by Parliament 
from 1857 onwards. Decennial censuses provide the demographic backdrop. This 
chapter explores spatial and temporal variation in poor law practices by using 
comprehensive, union-level data for the early 1850s. By 1850, the Poor Law Board (PLB) 
had been in place for three years and was operating what might be termed a ‘mature’ 
system of relief. The early 1850s were also an important demographic turning-point. 
The 1851 census revealed for the first time that more people in England lived in urban 
areas than in rural, as a result both of direct migration to towns and of those new urban 
dwellers increasing local birth rates.8 This period also has the advantage of data 
availability. 1850 is the earliest year for which a daily pauper count (held on 1 January) 
was published nationally for all unions.9 A population census was held in 1851, 
permitting demographic analysis; and rateable value (the local tax base) was recorded 
for the period. Records of the prices paid by individual unions for goods and services on 
a national scale are not readily found, as guardians were very rarely required to make 
returns of their contract prices. Data are available for 1850 and 1851, however, 
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published in an 1852 parliamentary paper which gives data for two six-month periods 
ending 25 March 1850 and 1851 respectively.10 There were other similar reports 
published, such as in 1843, but the 1852 paper gives costs per standardised quantities 
for the greatest number of unions. Details of suppliers to poor law unions were not 
recorded centrally, so local archives form the basis of that part of the analysis for 
Llanfyllin, a case-study union in this chapter. 
Most of the centrally-collected data is found in Parliamentary papers published by the 
Poor Law Commission, Poor Law Board or Local Government Board (Table 1). The 
central authority in all its forms was characterised by a focus on enumerating poor 
relief expenditure and on quantifying pauperism. The operation of the poor laws had 
been a subject of statistical inquiry well before their amendment in 1834, but a central 
government department with specific responsibility for poor relief administration had 
an unprecedented ability to gather, publish and analyse information on national and 
local practice.11 In part, this activity was aimed at holding poor law unions to account. It 
also can be seen in the context of increasing interest in methodologically rigorous 
approaches to data collection, evident in the close connections between poor law 
personnel and the Statistical Society of London. Edwin Chadwick, for instance, was 
appointed auditor to the society in 1835, within months of its establishment, and fellows 
included Frederick Purdy, who became head of the PLB’s statistical department, and 
William Golden Lumley, the PLC’s Assistant Secretary.12 The first article published in the 
society’s journal proper was by Assistant Poor Law Commissioner James Phillips Kay.13 
The sheer bulk of information collected by the poor law authorities presented analytical 
difficulties, and indeed the 1834 Report began with a description of the problems the 
commissioners had encountered: The replies to their circulated queries were ‘so 
numerous, that it became a question how they should be disposed of’.14 Modern 
scholarship has also found the volume of data to be a barrier to research.15 However, 
the quantity and detail of available information should be treated as an opportunity, 
rather than an obstacle.  
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Data type Source 
Population, 1851. British Parliamentary Papers (PP) 
1876 LXIII 1. Paupers. Indoor and outdoor paupers, 1 Jan 1850. 
Area in acres, 1854. PP 1854 LVI 1. Poor rates, &c. 
Rateable value of property assessed to the poor rate, 1852. 
Relief expenditure, year to 25 Mar 1850. PP 1851 XXVI 1. Third annual report 
of the Poor Law Board. 1850. 
Provisions prices, 1850 and 1851. PP 1852 XLV 7: Poor relief. 
Supplier records, Llanfyllin, 1844-80. Powys County Archives, M/G/B/8/1. 
Table 1: Selected poor law union data sources. 
The central authority collected information on the numbers of paupers in different ways 
over time. In 1847 the Poor Law Commission decided that the way it had counted 
paupers until then – in six-month periods to Lady-day and Michaelmas – was unwieldy. 
The possibility existed that different unions would count their paupers by different 
methods. Furthermore, the figures for indoor and outdoor paupers might not be 
comparable as, for example, an individual entering the workhouse three times in six 
months could be counted three times, whereas an individual receiving outdoor relief 
every fortnight for the same six months could be counted once.16 The PLB from 1848 
therefore asked unions to report their respective pauper numbers in and out of the 
workhouse on 1 January and 1 July.17 The relationship between these day-counts and 
total numbers of paupers relieved in the whole year is a difficult one to ascertain, given 
the flaws in the six-month counts, though some historians have attempted to ‘correct’ 
the day-counts by multiplying their averages by certain constants.18  
In this study, unless otherwise specified, only the 1 January count is used without any 
attempt at ‘correction’. 1 January is an arbitrary date for the collection of the figures – 
chosen for its administrative convenience by the Poor Law Board – and the numbers of 
paupers on that date do not represent the same proportion of paupers relieved for the 
whole year for every union. Figures for ‘expenditure per pauper’, for example, therefore 
should be read as expenditure for the full year divided by the number of paupers on 1 
January of that year. This ensures that all the figures are comparable. Figures for 
expenditure per pauper should therefore be treated as indicative only, as they do not 
represent actual sums spent per individual pauper.  
Having digitised the quantitative data from Parliamentary Papers, they were visualised 
and analysed using shapefiles created by EDINA UKBorders.19 Joining the data was a 
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fairly straightforward procedure, using unique identifying numbers for each poor law 
union. The shapefiles were available only for 1840 but the quantitative data was for 
1850, so some manual editing of the shapefile was required first to reflect boundary 
changes in the intervening years. 
Geo-referencing supplier locations was somewhat more challenging. Identities of 
winners of contracts were recorded in the minutes of unions’ board of guardians, which 
are usually in local archives if they have survived. Street addresses tended to be noted 
when the supplier was located within the union, especially within the town in which the 
workhouse stood. In many cases, though, just parishes, villages or towns were named, 
especially when the supplier was outside the union or in a village elsewhere in it. For 
example, a hypothetical record such as ‘James Smith, Baker, High Street’ would most 
likely have indicated the high street in the town containing the union workhouse. For a 
supplier outside the town, ‘John Brown, Butcher, Newtown’ would have been the usual 
record. Many records were more vague, however, especially when a long-standing 
supplier was well known to the board. Some archival cross-referencing provided more 
detail, but in most cases contemporary business directories were invaluable in 
narrowing down identities when there were multiple candidates.20 Business directories 
could also give addresses when they were missing from guardians’ minutes. The next 
step in geo-referencing was to use historic and modern maps to assign a modern 
equivalent street address to each supplier. This had to be done manually in the absence 
of reliable gazetteers capable of parsing historic addresses. These addresses were then 
run through Esri’s ArcGIS geocoding database to provide mappable coordinates. 
Inevitable gaps in the resulting data were filled manually by entering coordinates 
identified by cross-referencing historic and modern maps. Addresses could not reliably 
be identified for a handful of suppliers and these were omitted from the final database.  
Geographies of poor relief 
North Wales’s poor law unions in 1850 had among the highest rates of paupers in 
England and Wales. Pauperism cannot necessarily be seen a direct proxy for poverty, as 
paupers were people the guardians and their officers chose to relieve (though 
pauperism rates cannot be divorced from local poverty entirely). Low numbers of 
paupers, therefore, might not always indicate low levels of poverty in a given union: The 
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guardians might have been keen to keep the poor rates down and thus declined many 
applications. Though there was a regional trend towards higher pauperism in the north 
of Wales, clearly there was a good deal of intra-regional disparity between neighbouring 
unions nonetheless (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of paupers in populations in poor law unions, Wales, 1 January 1850. Source: See 
Table 1. 
This underlines the importance of local granularity in spatial analysis, a fact not lost on 
contemporaries: The guardians of individual unions did not like being treated as part of 
a single bloc, especially when it came to implementing policies seen as being a London 
solution to a problem inherent in the labour market of south-eastern England. Unions in 
Wales tended to use much more outdoor relief compared to their English counterparts, 
because of the expense of running workhouses in rural and remote areas – and no 
Welsh unions contained more than one person per acre on average (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Percentage of paupers relieved in the workhouse, 1 January 1850. Source: See Table 1. 
Between 1850 and 1870 most regions increased their use of the workhouse or were 
already using it to a significant degree. But in Wales, indoor pauperism increased over 
the twenty-year period by just one percentage point from a very low five per cent 
(Table 2).  
 Spend per indoor pauper Spend per outdoor pauper Indoor pauperism % 
Location type 
1850 
(£) 
1870 
(£) 
Change 
(%) 
1850 
(£) 
1870 
(£) 
Change 
(%) 
1850 
(%) 
1870 
(%) 
Change 
(%) 
London 8.92 9.75 +9 2.94 2.85 -3 23 26 +13 
Northern rural 6.10 7.50 +23 3.97 3.95 -1 12 13 +14 
Northern urban 6.12 7.60 +24 3.12 3.16 +1 11 17 +59 
Southern rural 5.65 6.97 +23 3.90 3.76 -4 16 14 -8 
Southern urban 6.36 8.20 +29 3.44 3.29 -4 19 19 +1 
Wales 5.80 7.31 +26 3.65 4.08 +12 5 6 +15 
Table 2. Mean spend per pauper type by relief and location-type of union, 1850 and 1870 (at 1850 
values). Source: PP 1851 XXVI 1; PP 1876 LXIII 1. 
Why did so many unions in Wales resist using the workhouse? Wales had among the 
lowest indoor pauperism rates, and was typified by resistance to the principles of the 
new poor law. The experiences of William Day, an assistant poor law commissioner 
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from 1835 to 1843, suggest some characteristics of the unions in Wales under his 
superintendence which contributed to their low indoor pauperism rate. From his 
perspective, the area was rife with abuses and intractable opposition to investing in 
workhouses, stemming from a combination of misconceptions about the new system 
and the vested interests of landowners. The ratepayers and guardians of the poor in 
many unions were stubbornly opposed to adopting the policies advocated by Day and 
the PLC, such as replacing their old and (in Day’s view) inadequate workhouses with 
expensive modern institutions. In 1839 he told the PLC: ‘I cannot but feel that the 
question henceforth whether you or the Guardians are to be masters in Wales is now in 
peril. I have been repeatedly told by the Guardians that you dare not enforce your 
orders, & in the confidence of this it is that they dare to disobey them.’21 He wrote to 
fellow assistant commissioner Sir John Walsham in 1840: ‘You cannot know the 
miseries of thirty or forty Welsh Guardians who won’t build a Workhouse, and 
consequently meet in the parlour of a pot house twelve feet by fourteen and keep all the 
windows shut and spit tobacco on your shoes – to say nothing of knowing not a word of 
what they are talking of in an unknown tongue.’22 Day’s confrontational style might 
have contributed to the guardians’ resistance, and after his forced resignation in 1843 
the PLC suggested he ‘was wanting not in activity but in discretion’.23 Here was 
entrenched resistance to expensive central government policies seen to be designed for 
the south of England, reinforced by a personality clash. 
Goods and suppliers 
Guardians acted locally, but they bought goods and services that were subject to 
national, regional and local markets and supply networks.  Local variations in price 
were key to some of the differences visible in relief practices, not simply because prices 
affected relief costs but because they were a product of the relationships between 
unions and suppliers in local economies. Understanding geographies of supply, 
therefore, is important in developing a clearer grasp of the factors that influenced the 
overall costs of poor relief.   
Buying low quality goods in bulk usually meant that unions paid prices at the bottom 
end of the range. However unions’ buying practices were also shaped by the nature of 
production costs, supply chains, local demand and competition – all of which varied by 
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commodity and by location. Regions of low prices did not necessarily produce regions of 
low relief expenditure, but relief practices were strongly influenced by the nature of the 
wider markets for particular goods, whether local, regional or national. Workhouse 
supplies must therefore be seen as a field of poor law management that was subject not 
just to administrative activity but also to market forces. 
Bread was the staple food of the general population and of paupers in particular.24 
When outdoor relief was given in kind, it tended to be wholly or partly in bread. It was 
also consumed in the workhouse, frequently with tea and butter for breakfast, as an 
accompaniment to soup or broth, as a substitute for potatoes with meat, or with cheese 
or butter for supper.25 Bread for paupers was renowned in popular culture for its poor 
quality, and Punch parodied the commercial prices columns in the likes of the Economist 
by reporting on ‘mysterious transactions in sawdust by the baker who liberally deals 
with the workhouse.’26   
The purchasing of bread and flour by poor law unions clearly demonstrates the 
significance of price in guardians’ procurement decisions. Unions had to supply bread to 
paupers and could choose between baking their own or buying from an external 
supplier (or a combination of both). In areas where high bread prices prevailed, unions 
tended to buy flour instead and baked their own loaves. Welsh unions almost entirely 
made their own, leading to large gaps in mapping the contract prices of bread agreed by 
poor law unions (Figure 3). It can also be seen in the low percentage of unions reporting 
their contract prices to the central authority compared to the other regions (Table 3).  
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Figure 3. Price paid by poor law unions in Wales for bread, 1850. Source: See Table 1. 
 Mean price, d/lb % returning prices 
London 1.19 92.6 
Northern Rural 1.15 65.0 
Northern Urban 1.13 66.0 
Southern Rural 1.09 89.7 
Southern Urban 1.06 96.0 
Wales 1.11 59.5 
All 1.11 78.5 
Table 3. Mean prices paid for bread by unions, by location type. Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
In many parts of England, unions gave a good deal of outdoor relief in kind – usually 
bread. In Wales, though, outdoor relief was not usually given in kind: Bread was not 
especially cheap, and we have seen that Welsh guardians defended their long-standing 
policies of giving outdoor paupers cash (Figure 4). There were fewer workhouses, and 
fewer paupers in them. But those workhouses that were in place were, at the very least, 
obliged to buy flour for their indoor paupers to bake into bread themselves. The map of 
flour prices has far fewer gaps than that of bread prices, therefore (many gaps being 
because of the absence of a workhouse), and we can also see much more regional 
uniformity in flour prices (Figure 5).  
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Figure 4. Percentage of outdoor relief given in kind, 1881, by Local Government Board poor law union 
divisions. Source: PP 1882 XXX Pt. I 1. 
 
Figure 5. Price paid by poor law unions in Wales for flour, 1850. Source: See Table 1. 
Where flour prices were high, so too were bread prices. The districts with fewer bread-
buyers were therefore those districts with high flour prices too – and the unions within 
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them had little option but to buy flour. Wales had the highest flour prices, yet nearly 95 
per cent of Welsh unions with workhouses returned prices (Table 4). 
 Mean price, d/lb % returning prices 
London 1.38 96.3 
Northern Rural 1.36 94.4 
Northern Urban 1.36 90.6 
Southern Rural 1.28 96.2 
Southern Urban 1.26 100.0 
Wales 1.42 94.6 
All 1.32 95.2 
Table 4. Mean prices paid for flour by unions, by location type. Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
Mapping the local prices of goods therefore enables us to see how costs directly affected 
unions’ purchasing decisions and relief policies.  
Case study: Llanfyllin poor law union 
The geography of the supply of goods to poor law unions was of fundamental 
importance to boards of guardians, to paupers and to the suppliers themselves. For 
guardians, knowledge of potential contracting partners was essential for achieving a 
suitable balance of cost and quality for ratepayers and paupers, and for maintaining 
good terms with those ratepayers who sold to unions. For suppliers, institutions such as 
workhouses, schools, infirmaries and asylums could be vital sources of income, and it 
was in suppliers’ interests to form connections with the officials responsible for 
allocating contracts. Poor law supply was therefore constituted socially, in the 
relationships between guardians and local business.  
These relationships potentially diminished with distance, however.27 Guardians were 
more likely to know businesses well if they were in their own unions – and especially in 
the same town – compared to those further away. Small traders were most likely to 
supply only the unions in which they were located, first because the ability to send 
goods cheaply over any greater distance was a function of scale, and second because the 
opportunities to form essential selling relationships were more present locally. Larger 
enterprises were therefore better able to supply distant unions. Over the second half of 
the nineteenth century, these larger businesses took on a greater role in poor law 
supply. Business was increasingly given to suppliers further from the workhouse – 
including some based in London. By around 1880 unions bought more from larger 
businesses which supplied a wider variety of goods, compared to thirty years earlier 
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when smaller local specialised traders had more poor law business. Nonetheless there 
were still, in 1880, opportunities for the smaller traders to supply unions, and the poor 
law remained a key source of revenue for these small businesses. Poor law unions could 
represent very stable and long-lasting sources of business for local suppliers who were 
capable of meeting their requirements. 
Llanfyllin was a large and mountainous union with a fairly small population, with 
Llanfyllin town connected by road and, from 1863, a branch rail line to the market 
towns of Oswestry and Shrewsbury. The majority of its workhouse’s suppliers in the 
1840s were inside the union, but a significant minority were outside. Several suppliers 
from outside Llanfyllin town, but within the union’s boundaries, provided goods such as 
straw, shoes, dairy produce, brushes and some groceries. The workhouse was supplied 
by a wide range of businesses from outside the union, including grocers, chandlers and 
potato merchants in Oswestry, stationers and shoemakers in Shrewsbury, and two dairy 
farmers in Llandidloes. Some goods had to bought from suppliers at a greater distance: 
glass from Birmingham, drapery from Manchester, stationery from London and slate 
from Pontrhydyfen, near Port Talbot. Five of the union’s fifty-three suppliers in 1844 
were partnerships and one was a company, all of which were outside the union. Because 
of the town’s remoteness, Llanfyllin’s traders did not have direct access to goods on the 
scale that the workhouse required, whereas those in Oswestry and Shrewsbury did.  
By 1880 there was a similar number and variety of suppliers from within the union as in 
1844, but patterns of distribution from outside the union had changed somewhat. It had 
fewer suppliers in total, and fewer suppliers from outside the union, in 1880 compared 
to 1844. But much of its provisions came from a single, out-of-union supplier: Joseph 
Evans of Oswestry, who sold the union oatmeal, split peas, coffee, sugar, candles, soap 
and soda. This business was performing the functions which thirty years earlier may 
well have been carried out by individual mealmen, grocers, chandlers and oilmen. Five 
companies supplied the union in 1880, four of which were outside the union, the other 
being the Llanfyllin Coal Company. As well as a few specialist suppliers (such as a 
shoemaker and cheesemonger in Shrewsbury, and a clock repairer in Corwen), there 
were now some larger enterprises supplying a greater range of goods. Because the 
region was increasingly well connected, Llanfyllin union was not obliged to seek goods 
from distant suppliers, though it was still not a hub in itself: Rather than buying from 
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businesses in Neath, Birmingham, Manchester and so on, therefore, it could buy more 
from Oswestry and Shrewsbury. 
 
Figure 6. Locations of suppliers to Llanfyllin poor law union, 1844 and 1880. Source: Minutes of board of 
guardians. 
Llanfyllin’s workhouse was a substantial consumer of goods from outside the union in 
the 1840s, despite not getting a rail link until 1863. In this respect, Llanfyllin resembled 
other Welsh unions that were hampered by poor communications. Merthyr Tydfil, for 
example, imported flour from Ireland to avoid high internal transport costs.28 
Furthermore, mid and north Wales did not have an effective internal market, and 
farmers tended to export to the Midlands and northern counties of England rather than 
finding buyers closer to home.29 This trade, and presumably the trade that brought 
goods into Llanfyllin, was frequently conducted on waterways.30 Nearby Newtown and 
Welshpool were on a branch of the Ellesmere canal which linked to the navigable 
Severn at Llanymynech, not far from Oswestry.31 Both the Severn and the 
Montgomeryshire Canal were used for freight transport.32 Those businesses which 
supplied Llanfyllin with goods from further afield would have used waterways such as 
these.  
Businesses did not simply interact with their customers: they also existed in relation to 
their competitors and colleagues and in the context of wider society. These relations 
constituted, and were a product of, the business environment. Contractual 
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arrangements made by poor law unions were characterised by a reliance on reputation 
and reliability, as well as on price, and Rose points to the ‘informal networks of mutual 
trust and interest’ in local business communities which kept transaction costs 
‘comparatively low’.33 This is borne out by poor law contracting, which was indeed a 
combination of formal and informal networks and arrangements, enabling well-placed 
small local businesses to participate. There were low barriers to entry for traders, but 
the ability to supply on a large scale was still restricted to those who had the required 
capital. 
Gaining a contract to supply a poor law union could be highly lucrative over the long 
term, though it was not easy to maintain a working relationship over many years when 
contracts were re-advertised every three or six months. This is clear from examining 
the longevity of supply relationships over the period 1850 to 1880. According to the 
guardians’ minutes, Llanfyllin bought from 75 individually named suppliers in that 
period, 24 of whom only held a contract for a single quarter. A relationship, once 
formed, could be fruitful for many years, underscoring the importance of social 
processes in the market economy. Many suppliers won poor-law business frequently, if 
not continuously, and a few suppliers held contracts for very long periods: James Fox 
supplied Llanfyllin with milk and butter, and occasionally shoes, for nearly the full 30 
years (110 quarters). Charles Jones supplied the workhouse with shoes for 90 quarters. 
Businesses attempting to gain the custom of the Llanfyllin guardians may well have 
found it very hard to gain a contract in the first place, but easier to maintain it once won 
(Figure 7). There were six periods of more than a year when no new suppliers were 
given any business. Furthermore, Llanfyllin’s guardians tended to award only one new 
supplier with a contract in any given period. The advantages to suppliers of bidding for 
poor law business were clear: Income was not just relatively secure over the course of 
one contract but also very likely to be repeated in future contracts. This was dependent 
on the supplier proving his or her reliability by meeting the expectations of the union. 
Winning the initial contract was the more difficult task, therefore, as the competition 
was between the known suppliers who potentially dominated the tendering process 
and the newcomers who relied on reputations built elsewhere and on lower bids. 
Guardians were wary of the ability of a low-bidding newcomer to deliver reliably, yet 
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they could not afford to ignore low bidders because of their responsibility to their 
ratepayer electorates. 
 
Figure 7. Number of new and not new suppliers to Llanfyllin union, 1854-80. Source: Minutes of board of 
guardians. 
Poor law supply can be seen as something akin to the exercise of patronage by union 
boards at those times and places where guardians knew their local pool of suppliers. 
Guardians relied on information about price and reliability which, in an open market 
and with all else being equal, would enable them to make the most appropriate decision 
for their ratepayers. Yet all else could not be equal as long as guardians had the 
discretion to choose arbitrarily: Trust – a social feature – was an integral part of poor 
law supply. This was true throughout the period considered here, but can be seen 
operating in different ways as bigger firms with a longer reach entered the market 
between the 1840s and 1880s. Boards of guardians formed business relationships with 
these bigger and more distant suppliers, but continued to work with smaller local 
suppliers too. As a relatively remote union, Llanfyllin had to buy from somewhat distant 
suppliers: its local businesses were comparatively poorly connected to wider markets, 
so it was obliged to buy from firms further afield (such as in Oswestry) which were 
higher up the supply chain. But contractors were ratepayers wherever possible, and 
guardians relied on continuity and reliability. Suppliers therefore ranged from 
individual shopkeepers and dealers to large industrial enterprises. However, ad hoc 
purchases may have been made in small quantities from local traders who were not 
ratepayers and who might have had incomes at the smaller end of the scale. The 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
S
u
p
p
li
e
rs
Suppliers: New Suppliers: Not new
DOUGLAS BROWN  DRAFT 
 20 
changes between the 1850s and 1880s can be attributed to a number of factors. Railway 
communications were important in reducing the cost of transporting goods, though 
existing infrastructure such as waterways were vital for relatively remote places earlier 
in the period. On a wider scale, developments such as telegraphy and cheaper steel 
allowed information and goods to be distributed in greater quantities and at longer 
distances.34 Poor law supply was therefore, for the most part, characterised by local 
knowledge networks and relationships, and this persisted even with the gradual 
introduction of bigger enterprises capable of supplying on a greater scale. 
Spatial thinking in socio-economic history 
The relative independence of guardians in their contracting practices means that the 
local geography of supply, and hence the spatial dimension of poor law activity, must be 
a vital consideration for poor law historians, just as it was for union boards. Unions did 
not have to form contracts based on the lowest tender, and a supplier could be chosen 
on the basis of a reputation for reliability, a personal relationship, or even a bribe. Poor 
law economies were thus emphatically embedded in social structures rather than 
adhering rigidly to the dictates of market prices. Geographic information systems are 
central to this understanding. By mapping and analysing poor relief, prices of goods and 
supplier locations we can begin to see how the social and the economic were 
intertwined.  
The research discussed in this chapter used relatively straightforward mapping 
techniques but defied a selection of more complex essays. An entire dataset for every 
union in England and Wales, containing a number of variables including expenditure, 
local tax base, pauper numbers and contract prices for several key goods, yielded no 
satisfactory results when attempts were made to model the drivers of local spending 
and relief type patterns through geographically weighted regression and principal 
components analysis. Meanwhile, regions of high and low spending, pauperism rates 
and workhouse use can be identified using clustering techniques and heat mapping, but 
these correspond so neatly to the choropleth maps shown here that they add little to 
our understanding. The findings discussed here can therefore be seen as a 
demonstration of the importance of mapping and visualising local, granular data for 
identifying trends, with the potential for more multifaceted analysis in the future. Until 
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now, little effort has been made to address Humphrey Southall’s ‘tentative’ suggestion, 
made in 1991, that ‘the general neglect of the spatially disaggregated national statistics 
in existing studies of the Poor Law is not altogether justified’.35 This research shows that 
GIS is capable of answering this call. 
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